The Copying Paradox: Why Converging Policies but Diverging Capacities in Eastern European Innovation Systems? by Erkki Karo & Rainer Kattel
Eastern European Innovation Systems      167 International Journal of Institutions and Economies
Vol. 2, No. 2, October 2010, pp. 167-206
The Copying Paradox: Why Converging Policies but 
Diverging Capacities in Eastern European 
Innovation Systems?
 
  Erkki Karo1  Rainer Kattel
  Tallinn University of Technology,   Tallinn University of Technology,
  Estonia  Estonia
  Email: erkki.karo@ttu.ee  E-mail: rainer.kattel@ttu.ee
Abstract: This paper analyzes the development of Eastern European 
innovation systems since the 1990s by looking at the theoretical and 
empirical accounts of two discourses that have had a significant impact 
on the development of innovation systems: innovation policy and public 
administration and management. We propose a framework for analyzing the 
development of innovation policies by distinguishing between two concepts 
– policy and administrative capacity – that are necessary for innovation 
policy making and implementation. Using the framework we show how 
the Eastern European innovation systems have because of past legacies and 
international policy transfers developed a highly specific understanding of 
innovation policy based on the initial impact of the Washington Consensus 
policies and later the European Union. We argue that because of the interplay 
between the principles and policy recommendations of the two international 
discourses we can see the emergence of a “copying paradox” in Eastern 
European innovation systems: that is, despite the perception of policy 
convergence, we can witness a divergence in the policy from the intended 
results, and as a result can talk about limited and de-contextualized policy-
making capacities.
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1. Introduction 
There seems to be an almost decade-long consensus on what the key 
problems are in innovation systems in Eastern European (EE) countries.2 
This consensus is shared by a large variety of people and institutions – from 
social scientists in and outside EE to official statements by the European 
Commission. In brief, there are two key challenges to the innovation systems 
in EE countries: first, the mismatch between R&D and education policies 
on the one hand and industry needs on the other (it can also be called a 
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high-technology bias); second, the strongly fragmented policy arena where 
coordination problems are rampant (see for a detailed country overviews, 
INNO-Policy TrendChart, 2006, 2007; also Radosevic, 2004, 2006; Reid 
and Peter, 2008). These problems were already partially detected, or their 
emergence predicted, in the late 1990s (see for instance Radosevic, 1998, 
1999) and by the 2000s, they formed the core of the European Commission’s 
message to the new member states regarding what they need to take into 
account while devising strategic plans for the implementation of the European 
Union’s (EU) structural funding between 2007 and 2013 (for a detailed 
overview, see Kattel, Reinert and Suurna, 2009). Yet, over the decade, the 
problems have persisted and seem to get worse. This article sets out to 
explore why this is so.
We argue that there are two main reasons. First, what we call the copying 
paradox: EE countries have been policy-takers from the start in the early 
1990s; at their core, economic and innovation policies have been copied and 
taken, first from the Washington Consensus (WC) toolbox and later from the 
EU. As a result, the innovation policies in EE have been converging with 
the developed countries’ policies. Yet, we aim to show that this convergence 
in policy is accompanied by the hollowing or non-emergence of the local 
capacity to analyze and evaluate domestic policy issues because of the de-
contextualization of policy-making through the very same convergence. 
That is, while EE countries are – voluntarily or involuntarily – increasingly 
copying and transferring policies from developed countries and international 
organizations, this usually exasperates their problems as local capacity 
development is thwarted. Thus, there is a copying paradox: the more EE 
countries are converging on the policy level (the more “mainstream” policies 
they choose), the lower their actual capacity at development becomes, hence 
diverging capacities for development.
This paradox is, secondly, significantly enabled and enhanced by what 
we call path dependencies in the ways innovation systems have developed in 
EE. More precisely, we aim to show that the timing of when EE economies 
rejoined global capitalism was highly specific in terms of the policy and 
academic advice that the new economies and their policy-makers received. 
In fact, the article shows that in addition to initial timing specifics, also the 
accession to the EU served as an additional element in certifying earlier 
developments. There are two key areas in the policy and academic advice that 
the EE countries received since the early 1990s (and in some cases, already 
in the 1980s): economic and innovation policy (here discussed as innovation 
policies – IP) and governance (or public policy and administration – PPA). 
We argue that in both fields, the early 1990s were a highly particular time in 
terms of what ideas dominated the respective discourses: in the former, the 
WC provided the most dominant ideas of how to restructure the economy, 
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and in the latter, the New Public Management (NPM) provided the most 
dominant ideas of how to manage democratic polities. While both discourses 
within and outside EE countries have noticeably evolved during the past 20 
years, we aim to show that the initial path determined by these two core ideas 
(WC and NPM) is still fundamental to EE innovation systems and, perversely, 
the accession to the EU has in many ways deepened the path dependencies 
because the capacity for policy development has been thwarted.
In the following section we will develop a theoretical framework for 
analyzing innovation policy development in catching-up or developing 
economies that we will be later used in a first attempt for analyzing innovation 
policy emergence and development in EE countries. 
2.   Analyzing Innovation Policy Development in Catching-up Economies
Although the paper mainly deals with the developments of innovation policy, 
it borrows its main conceptual ideas and approaches from the public policy 
and administration (PPA) discourse to explain the actual development of 
innovation policy in a specific context, the EE. We believe that at least in the 
case of policy-making in developing or transition countries this adds value to 
the analysis in two ways. 
First, we start with the working-hypothesis that in much of the theoretical 
and policy-relevant literature on industrial development and especially 
on innovation policy, we can witness a rather evident over-generalization 
or simplification of the role of politics and policy-making. The actual 
implementation of the proposed “policy” is usually presumed to take place 
as theorized (e.g., politicians should adopt what is prescribed by theories or 
ideal types) or explained to be dependent on the administrative capacity of 
a specific country or region, and consequently, no significant differentiation 
is made between political choices over policies and the ability to implement 
policies. We believe that the IP discourse has much to gain from further 
elaborating on the role of government and governance – especially as the 
PPA discourse offers a more thorough analytical focus on the issues of policy 
emulation (see also Reinert, 2007).
Second, PPA literature on its own is mostly concerned with the issues of 
policy and administrative capacity, that is with how policy decisions are made 
and implemented and not so much with the theoretical underpinnings of the 
different policy choices put in front of policy processes.3 Therefore, the PPA 
discourse in the context of developing and transition states makes a sort of 
“reversed-presumption” compared to the IP discourse: the PPA discourse does 
not question the theoretical validity and practical suitability of the dominant 
discourse on innovation put in front of the policy-making process. 
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Thus, in essence, both PPA and IP discourses assume that the other has got 
it “right”, and neither questions the validity of each other’s assumptions: IP 
discourse assumes the presence of administrative capacity and PPA discourse 
assumes the presence of valid innovation policy choices and capacities. Thus, 
while we analyze both discourses in parallel, our dominant approach comes 
from the PPA discourse. We will show that the analysis of the discourse of 
PPA will provide us with tools and arguments to explain the resulting path-
dependencies in the IP development and policy results; the parallel analysis of 
discourses will hopefully bring us closer to comprehensively describing and 
explaining the specific trajectory of IP development in EE countries.
2.1 Concepts and Principles for an Analytical Framework
From the PPA discourse on how policies are generally made and implemented 
we have distilled three analytical concepts or theoretical principles that can be 
merged into a coherent theoretical and analytical framework that can be used 
for comprehensive analysis of a policy field. 
Content and Implementation of Policies
Firstly, in order to analyze a particular public policy, one has to look at both 
the content of the policy (i.e. what is the perception of the main goals and 
content of innovation policy) and the capacity of actually achieving the results 
of the policy (i.e. does the institutional capacity of a particular country/context 
support achieving the defined goals of policy) (see also Painter and Pierre, 
2005a; and, for a wider context Pollitt, 2008). 
In order to specify the concept of capacity, we distinguish between three 
concepts where a discussion of the role of the state and public policies is of 
relevance (based on Painter and Pierre, 2005b: 2-7): 
(1)  The broadest concept can be defined as “state capacity”, which means 
achieving appropriate outcomes such as sustainable economic develop-
ment and welfare (based on values such as legitimacy, accountability, 
compliance, consent). In essence, IP discourse refers to this level when 
discussing the issues of administrative capacity or the capacity of the 
government to implement theoretically sound or ideal-type innovation 
policies. It can also be viewed as the extent and depth of government 
involvement in the policy area. The PPA discourse elaborates on this 
concept by distinguishing two interlinked concepts (each with its own 
theoretical and analytical approaches) that are both preconditions for the 
state capacity to emerge.
(2)  “Policy capacity” refers to the ability to make intelligent policy choices 
(based on values such as coherence, public “regardingness”, credibility, 
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decisiveness, resoluteness); in the context of IP, policy capacity refers to 
the ability of the political system to decide or compromise on the best 
approach (what is “desirable” and what is “feasible”) to innovation and 
development.4 
(3)  The level or quality of the policy capacity is dependent on the third 
concept, namely “administrative capacity”, which refers to effective 
resource management (based on values such as economy, efficiency, 
responsibility, probity, equity); this capacity refers to the ability of the 
political system to use its resources for implementing the policy choices 
that have been made. Administrative and policy capacity have to be seen 
as interdependent because the institutional memory of a political system 
that is pivotal for making intelligent policy choices is largely stocked both 
in institutions of administration and institutions of policy-making.
This kind of analytical differentiation that we have provided has not been 
an inherent part of developing public policies in transition countries, such 
as the EE countries. The transition from the communist to the democratic 
societies has created the overwhelming challenge to look at all of these levels 
at once and create/reform/develop these capacities. The EE countries have had 
to reform and restructure their core institutions in parallel with introducing 
new policies. This has been a recognized task both in the literature on public 
administration and management (Randma-Liiv, 2009; Agh, 2003; Aslund, 
2002; Verheijen, 2003) and in the literature on innovation and development 
(Radosevic, 2009; Tiits et al., 2008; Török, 2007). We will argue that this 
has been a considerable challenge precisely because the EE countries have 
“looked up” to so-called benchmark regions and institutions (the EU, the 
OECD, World Bank, IMF), and the lessons that the EE countries have been 
given and what they have themselves taken over (transferred) are rather 
generalized and de-contextualized. Thus, policy development has not been 
based on substantive policy learning but often “fast-and-furious” copying 
of a specific policy discourse. By elaborating on the development of these 
three levels, the path dependency of the initial choices and their impact of 
unexpected results will hopefully become explicit. In the context of EE 
innovation policy development, we will try to track the development of these 
three levels of capacity since 1990.
The Policy Convergence Approach
As a second core principle that can be used to verify the existence of 
decontextualization of policies, our analysis utilizes the policy convergence 
approach (see for example Bennett, 1991; Drezner, 2001; Heichel et al., 
2005; Knill, 2005). This approach analyzes the possible tendencies towards 
convergence of national policies in the sense of “development of similar or 
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even identical policies across countries over time” (Knill, 2005: 1), or “the 
tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, 
processes, and performances” (Kerr, 1983), or “any increase in the similarity 
between one or more characteristics of a certain policy (e.g. policy objectives, 
policy instruments, policy settings) across a given set of political jurisdictions 
(supranational institutions, states, regions, local authorities) over a given 
period of time” (Knill, 2005: 5). These processes are perceived to take place 
due to generic phenomena like globalization, Europeanization, etc.
Policy convergence can be viewed as an umbrella concept for concepts 
or notions such as isomorphism,5 policy transfer,6 and policy diffusion7 (see 
Knill, 2005). These concepts, especially policy transfer and policy diffusion, 
have grown in importance in the context of the transition in EE countries. 
The different notions exemplify that policy convergence in the form of taking 
over policies from other contexts and countries can happen in different ways 
(voluntarily or involuntarily; consciously or more or less unconsciously etc.).
Thus, policy convergence and its related concepts shed light on the 
analytical levels that can be used for analyzing the convergence trends as 
summarized in Table 1.
Therefore we can see that there is a distinct difference between focusing 
on effects and processes within the context of policy convergence: similar 
processes may and may not lead to similar effects or outcomes and similar 
effects may or may not be the result of similar processes or policies with 
similar characteristics. This differentiation can in our view offer significant 
explanatory weight in discussing the policy reforms of transition or catching-
up countries. In our categorization, policy diffusion describes the mediated or 
managed spread of new policies and ideas that does not reflect conscious or 
intended learning or transfer from another context. Policy transfer on the other 
Table 1: Overview of Policy Convergence8
  Policy   Isomorphism  Policy   Policy
  convergence    transfer  diffusion
Analytical focus  Effects  Effects  Process  Process
Empirical focus  Policy   Organizational   Policy   Policy
  characteristics  structures  characteristics  characteristics
Dependent variable  Similarity  Similarity  Transfer   Adoption
  of change  of change  content and   patterns
      transfer 
      process
Source: Knill (2005).
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hand describes a policy-making process that reflects a more conscious analysis 
of and learning from the experience of other regions and countries.9
Historical Institutionalism
Thirdly, we use the toolbox of “historical institutionalism” (see Pierson, 
2004) for longitudinal and dynamic tracking of the trajectories of policies and 
especially for explaining the changes or the persistence of specific models and 
paths of development. The starting point of this approach is the claim that 
“the policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when policy 
is initiated, will have continuing and largely determinate influence over the 
policy far into the future” (Peters 2005: 71). Therefore, we talk about “path-
dependencies” in institutional development and in public policy-making. 
Yet, this has to be seen as a tendency and not a rule of thumb, meaning that 
if the prevalence of path dependencies would be a universal phenomenon, it 
would be futile to use this approach for assessing possibilities for fundamental 
transformations and changes of institutions and policies (Pollitt, 2008). 
Therefore, we use this approach to highlight the instances – critical junctures 
or punctuations – where fundamental changes in institutions and policies have 
or could have taken place, i.e. the instances where the tendencies towards 
path-dependency are potentially superseded by other factors. Also, we will use 
the approach to argue that by looking at the historical development trajectory 
of the IP from the perspective of EE since its emergence (beginning of the 
1990s), we can see that the changes of policy in essence reflect perceptionally 
significant, but still within the path changes – cycles/alternations – of the 
policy. Therefore, the lens of “historical institutionalism” provides both 
theoretical and analytical arguments to explain why it is possible to witness a 
“copying paradox”, i.e. contradictory tendencies of both seemingly converging 
policies and diverging outcomes in policy and policy-making capacity. 
Table 2 summarizes our approach to analyzing innovation policy from 
PPA perspective. To put it into the context of “typical” innovation policy 
analysis, our approach looks at the level of how innovation systems10 are 
governed and managed.
In the following section we will analyze the effects level convergence of 
the innovation policy in EE – that is, we will provide a stylized description of 
the innovation policy development in EE and indicate how it has resulted in 
the “copying paradox”. This will be followed by a discussion that will provide 
a tentative causal argument on how innovation policy emerged and developed 
from specific discourses of IP and PPA that were largely based on process 
level convergence into policy models. We will discuss our findings in the 
historical-institutional framework to highlight how the discursive convergence 
of IP and PPA since the 1990s has locked the EE policies into a distinct path 
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of development (the path dependency) that is becoming increasingly more 
difficult to break from.
3. Evolution of Innovation Policy in Eastern Europe since the 1990s
From the existing scientific and policy analytical literature, we can distil two 
fundamental problems that have persisted in the innovation systems of EE 
countries for a decade if not longer.11 First, in most EE countries, there is 
a long-standing and strong mismatch between R&D and education system 
outcomes and industry needs. This mismatch has in turn two mutually 
enforcing aspects: on the one hand, innovation policies in EE tend to 
focus on high technology (for instance, commercialization of R&D results, 
technology parks, incubators, etc.); on the other hand, the actual economic 
and industrial structure is characterized by low productivity growth and 
is dominated by outsourcing activities with very low demand for R&D or 
indeed for most outcomes targeted by innovation policies. Second, in most 
EE countries, innovation policies suffer from double fragmentation: on the 
one hand, there is a strong fragmentation and divide between various actors 
in the innovation system (universities, companies and governments); on the 
other hand, also within the public sector, fragmentation between various 
policy areas (education, industry, energy, etc.) is strong. Such a double 
fragmentation leads to massive and systematic coordination failures in policy 
design, implementation and evaluation. Clearly, the two challenges stem 
from different discourses (innovation vs. administration) but are connected 
and enforce each other. In this section, however, we intend to show how 
Table 2:   The Levels and Nature of Analysis of Innovation Policy from the 
  Public Policy and Administration Perspective
  Effects level  Process level
Unit of analysis  Policies implemented, their   Public discourses and policy
  impact on the real economy   choices in and around
  and innovation system  innovation system
Patterns of analysis  Levels of capacity (state,   Levels of convergence
  policy and administrative)  (discursive and process)
Results of analysis  Tracing the changes in   Identification of critical
  capacities (increasing,   junctures and path
  decreasing; contextualized,   dependencies
  de-contextualized) and 
  innovation systems
Source: Authors.
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these challenges originate from the application of the WC policy toolbox to 
EE economies and while the EU recognized and emphasized these problems 
throughout the accession process and during the establishment of management 
systems for implementing EU’s structural funding (the main vehicle for 
achieving economic restructuring and convergence) in the 2000s, the EU’s 
influence has, perversely, enforced or even deepened these challenges.
We also show below that the “original sin” that led to the long-standing 
and systemic problems in EE innovation systems was misunderstanding the 
nature of the Soviet R&D system and industry. This misunderstanding, as 
we will show in the next section, was largely caused by the timing of the 
EE countries’ re-entry into the global economy, and later we will argue that 
policies based on this misunderstanding can be seen as the “critical juncture” 
in creating the specific path-dependency in the innovation policy development 
in EE.
3.1 Restructuring the Soviet R&D System and Industry 
At the end of the 1980s, EE and former Soviet economies were generally 
highly industrialized, and many of these economies were seemingly on a path 
of industrialization and growth similar to that of the East Asian economies. 
According to World Bank data, countries like Estonia, Latvia and Hungary 
were ahead of Korea in the early 1980s in terms of industrial value added per 
capita (World Bank, 2009). However, the industrialization of EE countries was 
widely understood to be highly artificial and ineffective, in other words using 
excessive amounts of resources and other inputs to produce goods. Thus, 
after regaining independence, restructuring the economy and in particular, the 
industry was on top of the agenda for all EE countries. In fact, in many ways 
what was desired was not so much industrial restructuring but a more radical 
and comprehensive replacement of the old Soviet industry with one similar 
to the Western industries.
Washington Consensus policies, coming to full articulation and force 
around the same time, i.e. the late 1980s and early 1990s, offered a very 
coherent and relatively simple set of policies to deliver the restructuring 
and replacement. Rodrik (2006: 978) and, also Williamson (2002) offer an 
interesting summary of what the WC originally was (“Original Washington 
Consensus”) and how it changed during the 1990s into an augmented 
version (“Augmented Washington Consensus”). For EE countries, only the 
original version and understanding has been of relevance as the economic 
restructuring was centred first of all on issues such as setting up basic 
legislation (from property rights to tax regimes) liberalization, deregulation, 
and decentralization (including privatization). There was much less emphasis 
and explicit prioritization of issues reflected in the augmented version of the 
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WC, i.e. issues of both public and private governance (from corruption to 
corporate governance) and social policies (from labour market flexibility to 
poverty reduction). Critics of the WC policies have largely argued that it can 
not be a sustainable option to have the former without the latter.
Even though all EE countries set out to implement WC-inspired reforms 
(see Radosevic, 2009), Drahokoupil (2007: 90) offers a very interesting way 
of how to group different strategies followed by EE countries in the 1990s: 
“The competition states in the Visegrád four12 can be called Porterian, 
aiming at attracting strategic FDI through targeted subsidies…. The Baltic 
competition states can be called macroeconomic stability-driven neoliberal 
states with monetary institutions at their core…. Finally, Slovenia has 
developed a distinct type of competition state, which can be characterized as 
a balanced neo-corporatist.” However, as Weissenbacher (2007: 71) argues, 
Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia had experiences of dealing with IMF 
already during the 1980s when they borrowed from it and applied standard 
austerity programs. Thus, while there are clear differences in accents, the 
general framework offered by WC was applied in all EE countries throughout 
the 1990s and indeed the policy sets were converging during the 1990s 
(Drahokoupil, 2007).
Furthermore, WC-inspired policies were equated by most EE countries 
with innovation and industrial policy measures and in essence there were no 
other policy initiatives during the 1990s that could be defined as conscious 
innovation and industrial policies. During this period, almost all of the 
economic policy capacity building was directed towards macro-economic 
competencies (at central banks, ministries of finance, also think tanks). 
This was greatly helped by the advice and assistance from the Washington 
institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, but also from OECD. Innovation 
policy was considered secondary to transition-related concerns (Mickiewicz 
and Radosevic, 2001: 10). As there were no innovation policies proper, there 
was also essentially no institution building for or in the innovation systems. 
WC-inspired policies were understood to deliver economic stability to attract 
foreign direct investments that were to become vehicles of delivering actual 
restructuring and replacement of Soviet industry. In other words, market 
demand was understood to deliver economic restructuring and along with 
it create also a need and direction for innovation-system reform (R&D, 
education systems, labour policy, etc.). Capacity building in specific areas of 
innovation systems seemed superfluous; indeed, the R&D system was seen in 
many ways as too big (employing too many people) and ineffective (too far 
from the private sector) (Radosevic, 1998, 1999 offer good overviews).
Thus, market discipline in the form of WC-inspired policies replaced 
actual capacity building; the market was seen as the producer of priorities. 
Indeed, this is perhaps the most important feature of WC in general: it 
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presupposed that all development problems are fundamentally alike (be it in 
Africa or Russia). It took away the burden of domestic capacity building and 
evaluation and replaced it with a set of universal policies. This is the direct 
opposite of the previous development consensus. As Hirschman (1958), one 
of the classical development economists argues, all development presupposes 
some form of priority setting through policy making. The WC did away 
exactly with this assumption: since all development problems are assumed to 
be of the same nature, the solutions are bound to be the same as well, and this 
takes the burden of proof, so to say, away from domestic policy-making (see 
furthermore Kattel, Kregel and Reinert, 2009).
However, it can be argued that for EE countries, the WC-based policies 
also created a relatively strong legitimization for newly written constitutions 
and laws and for the policy process based on these. Precisely because the 
impetus of reform came from outside, these reforms were somewhat safer 
from being questioned than home-grown initiatives would have been. At 
the same time, the legitimacy of the state or the understanding of the state 
capacity was highly reflective of the WC ideas resulting in no-policy policies 
in innovation and industrial policy areas.
In reality, the WC policies were effective in destroying the old industrial 
structure. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, most EE and other former Soviet 
economies saw deep dives in their growth rates and industry as well as in 
the value added of the service sector. It took more than a decade for most 
EE countries to reach the growth and development levels of 1990 (see 
furthermore Tiits et al., 2008). This is particularly so in the case of former 
Soviet republics. According to the World Bank’s (2006) calculations, the 
recession many former Soviet republics (e.g. Ukraine) experienced during 
the 1990s, and are still experiencing, is worse than the Great Depression in 
the USA and World War II in Western Europe (in both cases, recovery was 
considerably quicker).
This cognitive dissonance between promise of reforms and actual 
developments was caused by one of the most striking features of post-Soviet 
development in the 1990s: the rapid primitivization of industrial enterprises or 
even the outright destruction of many previously well-known and successful 
companies. This happened because of the way Soviet industrial companies 
were built up and run in a complex web of planning and competition 
(Radosevic, 1998). A sudden opening of the markets and the abolition of capital 
controls made these industrial companies extremely vulnerable. The partially 
extreme vertical integration that was the norm in such companies meant that if 
one part of the value chain ran into problems due to the rapid liberalization, it 
easily brought down the entire chain or complex. However, foreign companies 
seeking to privatize plants were almost always interested in only part of the 
value-chain (a specific production plant, infrastructure or location), and thus 
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privatization turned into the publicly led attrition of companies and jobs (see 
for example, Frost and Weinstein, 1998; Young, 1994).
Such a drastic change made it relatively easy to actually replace Soviet 
industry. With the macroeconomic stability and liberalization of markets, 
followed by a rapid drop in wages, many former Soviet economies became 
increasingly attractive as privatization targets and outsourcing of production. 
Indeed, one of the most fundamental characteristics of EE industry (and 
services) since 1990 has been that the majority of companies have engaged in 
process innovation (i.e. in the form of acquiring new machinery and mastering 
production capabilities) in seeking to become more and more cost-effective in 
the new market place (Tiits et al., 2008).
Perversely mirroring the above-described “cluster”-like characteristic 
of Soviet industrial activities, the Soviet R&D system was based on similar 
vertical integration of R&D into specialized institutions: “Under socialism, 
most technical change was pushed from one institutional sector… which was 
essentially a grouping of R&D institutes and other related activities…. This 
sector involved in activities far beyond R&D including design, engineer-
ing and often trouble-shooting activities” (Radosevic, 1999: 282). These 
institutions were usually also the originators and carriers of patents and 
forms of intellectual property rights (Radosevic, 1999: 285). This means 
that the Soviet-style R&D system had a very low level of company in-house 
R&D (Radosevic, 1998: 80-81). Industrial conglomerates were effectively 
cut off from various potential learning and feedback loops; production and 
actual innovation (in particular in the form of new products and processes) 
took place in different institutions, both however highly concentrated and 
integrated. Thus, in general, the system was highly linear and supply-based.
The once complex engineering, designing or similar tasks were very 
rapidly replaced in the transition processes by significantly simpler com-
modified support activities as many companies were wiped out, privatized 
or restructured. The former R&D institutes could have played a key role in 
bridging academic research with industry needs as they were essentially the 
only existing link between the two. With the collapse of the institute system, 
the link between academy and industry became, as Radosevic suspected in 
1998, the weakest link in the EE R&D system. Indeed, in “conditions of high 
uncertainty and prolonged privatization, the intangible assets and know-how 
of industrial institutes, primarily embodied in R&D groups, probably erodes 
much faster than production skills in industry” (Radosevic, 1998: 100).
The massive onslaught of FDI, in particular since the second half of the 
1990s, and the privatization of enterprises gave foreign enterprises a key role 
in industrial restructuring and innovation. This, in turn, only reinforced the 
severing of linkages between former R&D institutes and the enterprise sector 
(see Radosevic, 1999: 297).
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In particular when compared to East Asia’s developments over the same 
period, EE transition in the 1990s is in many ways a lost decade in terms 
of basic R&D indicators. In Figures 1-4, South Korea is used as a proxy 
for East Asian countries and Mexico for Latin America.13 The figures show 
that EE countries converge with Latin American trends and not with East 
Asian ones.
The decrease in GERD from 1990 onwards until the end of the decade 
coincides, as we will show below, with the big divide in EE innovation 
policies. With the beginning of the accession negotiations and increasing 
funding from the EU, EE countries’ investments into R&D started to increase 
while the preceding decade mirrors the ideas of WC policies that market 
initiatives (also in form of R&D investments) are more important and efficient 
than public sector intervention.
Figures 2 and 3 indicate very similar tendencies in patent applications 
and scientific publications in EE compared to East Asia and Latin America. 
While EE and Latin America are more or less flat-lining since 1990 or 1985 
respectively, South Korea’s development is qualitatively highly different.
Against this background, the significance of the rapid increase in high 
technology exports in EE countries becomes clearer (Figure 4). In high 
technology exports, EE and Latin America clearly follow the same path as 
East Asian economies.
Figure 1:  General Expenditure on Research and Development as % of GDP,
   1990-2006.
Source: OECD database.

















































































Figure 2: Patent Application at European, US and Japanese Patent Offices, 




































































































Source: World Bank WDI Online database.
Figure 3: Scientific and Technical Articles, 1985-2005; 1985=100.
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The dissonance between the disintegrating R&D system, the much slower 
pace of catching up and rapidly growing high tech exports is perhaps the best 
indicator of how importantly the change in the global production networks 
and in particular the rise of outsourcing production altered the perception 
of what is happening in EE countries. While exports indicate a high growth 
in high technology areas, all other indicators show that this is largely an 
illusion based on a deception created by growth in outsourcing activities. 
What is statistically captured as a high technology product may in reality 
be very different in nature: it can be touch screens for iPhones or it can be 
assembled mobile phones for any brand mobile producer. Both show up as 
high technology statistics, yet the former is a product at the beginning of its 
life cycle and the latter has clearly reached maturity. Consequently, even if 
high technology exports have been growing in EE, this does not mean that 
we deal with similarly dynamic sectors with significantly increasing returns 
(see Krugman, 2008). However, this deceptive picture created an image of EE 
countries as quickly catching up with developed countries and also that this 
catching up is based on high-tech exports. Consequently, in the next section we 
will show how in the 2000s the EE set out to focus on the innovation policy in 
intensifying the R&D content of exports and that with the help of the EU.
In Table 3 at the end of this chapter we have comparatively summarized 
how these misinterpretations can be seen to have affected policy-level thinking 
Figure 4:  High Technology Exports as % of All Manufactured Exports, 
  1988-2006


























































































IJIE vol2-2 Karo.indd   181 8/20/2010   1:44:31 PM182      Erkki Karo and Rainer Kattel  
on innovation and economic development and how this can be interpreted in 
the context of our framework. 
3.2  Europeanization of Innovation Policy in Eastern Europe since 199814 
While the EU’s importance for EE countries’ economic policies was visible 
already during the early 1990s, the change that increased the EU’s impact 
considerably was the beginning of accession talks with most EE countries in 
1998 and later. Indeed, Havlik et al. (2001) argue that the adoption of the EU’s 
acquis communautaire has had a much stronger impact on the modernization 
of EE industry than official (often rudimentary) innovation policy during the 
1990s. The introduction of new regulations (usually with significantly higher 
safety, health and other standards) meant that EE industry “was forced to 
choose whether to modernize their products and production facilities rather 
drastically, to subject themselves to mergers with bigger players with greater 
economies of scale, or to close down altogether” (see Tiits et al., 2008: 76-77). 
In essence, on the one hand, the harmonization process was a continuation of 
restructuring processes that started during the previous period and were even 
significantly enforced. On the other hand, through so-called pre-structural 
funding and its management, many EE countries started to develop the first 
strategic documents and policies related to innovation and R&D proper. In 
this context, as we will show, the matters of administrative capacity became 
even more explicit and dominant of the policy discourse.
However, similar to WC-inspired reforms in the 1990s, the harmonization 
process was seen largely as a further legitimization of EE’s path. Thus, the end 
itself – accession to the EU – became much more important than what was 
being harmonized and how. Due to considerable self-imposed time pressure 
– harmonizing the legal infrastructure and preparing for accession in six years 
– the adoption of the EU’s legal infrastructure was done hastily and without 
much attention to the local context (Phare Consolidated Summary Report, 
2004, 2007; see also Goetz, 2001; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004). 
Much of the harmonization was carried out through financial instruments (i.e. 
the Phare funding and later pre-structural funding and since 2004 structural 
funding schemes that finance policy instruments geared towards structural 
and economic convergence) that were based on EU-imposed policy logic 
and explicit emphasis on the need to create sufficient administrative capacity 
inside the EE.
In the late 1990s, the EU-led managerial reforms of the financing mecha-
nisms brought about a system of implementation agencies (administrative 
agents) linked to the National Funds in EE (EC Regulation 1266/99; 
Commission Decision on the Review of the Phare Guidelines for the period 
2000-2006; Grabbe, 2006: 82). This marks the first step in EE towards 
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explicitly managing economic policy, and thus innovation and industrial 
restructuring, in a manner distinctly different from the previous period where 
the free market and external forces were seen as key drivers of change. 
However, it is also important to see that these newly established agencies 
were created by the EU initiative and are mostly for managing external (EU) 
funding; policy creation and respective capacity building plays almost no 
conscious role in these agencies. The compartmentalized and structured nature 
of EU support (Phare Consolidated Summary Report, 2007) on the one hand, 
and the lack of a tradition of partnership and inter-institutional coordination 
and cooperation between administrative levels inherited from the 1990s on the 
other hand, meant that most positive effects of such agencies were not reaped 
and that in some cases, they created more difficulties and problems than they 
solved (IRS, 2005). 
The core argument behind this managerial reform was the perception 
that the problem with the existing administrative structure in EE was its path-
dependent inefficiency (i.e. ministries were part of the old “corrupt” Soviet 
system) that could have been solved through agents independent both from 
past legacies and political intervention (for general theoretical argument of 
“agencification” (i.e. increased use and creation of regulatory, executive and 
other types of agencies for regulation, implementation and evaluation of 
policies), see for example Pollitt et al., 2004; Pollitt, 2005; Christensen and 
Laegreid, 2005, 2006; Verhoest and Bouckaert, 2005). In essence, the ideal-
type model was based on the presumption that an increase of the autonomy 
of the agents will be accompanied by an increase in control and regulation 
by the principals (firstly that of the EU and thereafter that of the national 
political system) to sustain accountability. Yet, the international critique of the 
“agencification” reforms has always emphasized the fact that even if a certain 
increase of managerial efficiency is achieved, it can be accompanied by the 
loss of already existing policy capacity or the ability to create new policy 
capacities that are required in changing circumstances.15
In sum, in many ways, the harmonization with the EU rules is a period 
where policies supported the restructuring of the industry that began in the 
1990s under the WC policies; on the other hand, during this period, the EU’s 
influence on funding and administrative schemes brought with it the creation 
of novel governance structures that up to today play a key part in innovation 
policy in EE. Therefore, we can interpret this shift as a continuation of the 
development of the WC-based state capacity that is largely equated with 
or seen as sufficient for policy capacity and supplemented with managerial 
attention to administrative capacity.
However, if we look at what Radosevic calls “national innovation 
capacities”, these were by 2000 clearly underdeveloped in all EE countries 
compared to the “old” member states (Figure 5; Radosevic, 2004).
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Clearly, the disintegration of the R&D system that began with the 
transition was still in full force during the harmonization period. And, while 
it can be argued that by 2000 the EE economies, and in particular their 
innovation capacities, grouped these countries into two groups of stronger 
and weaker performers (Radosevic, 2004: 660), most EE economies started 
to recover from the transition losses by 2000. However, in particular with 
increasing flows of FDI into EE and growing high technology exports, the 
recovery was interpreted as imminent catching-up or convergence with the 
“old” Europe. This misconception became the key driver of innovation 
policies in EE from 2004 onwards.
While harmonization with the EU legal infrastructure was important both 
in terms of the actual changes it brought to the industry and in terms of policy 
implementation and administrative agencies that were created to manage the 
EU’s financial help, the key changes in innovation of policy proper came 
with the EU structural funding17 that started in 2004 and is set to continue 
at least until 2013. Indeed, as we will see below, the EU structural funding 
significantly changed both the policy content and implementation. However, 
as we will also see below, key problems that emerged during the 1990s (low 
networking, weak coordination and significant cooperation problems) may 
have in fact deepened or cemented during the current period.
The key content for many innovation policy initiatives in EE emerging 
after the accession was the underlying assumption that similar to “old” 
European countries, the new members need to overcome the so-called 
“European paradox” (good basic research, low commercialization of the 
research results).18 This is mostly due to the miscued policy transfer from the 
EU to the member states (see also INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports, 
Figure 5:  National Innovation Capacity (NIC) Index for 
  EU Member States 200016
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2006, 2007). Accordingly, innovation and R&D policies emerging in EE in 
the mid-2000s were rife with a linear understanding of innovation. Innovation 
is seen as something close to science and invention, and it is assumed that 
there is a more or less linear correspondence between scientific discovery and 
high innovation performance and that innovations behave like Nokia’s mobile 
phones so that the search for the latter became the holy grail of EE innovation 
policy. Thus, EE innovation policies emerging in the early and mid-2000s 
tend to concentrate on high technology sectors, on commercializing university 
research, technology parks for start-ups and similar efforts (Radosevic, 2002: 
355; Radosevic and Reid, 2006: 297; also INNO-Policy TrendChart Country 
Reports, 2006, 2007 for comprehensive overviews of EE countries’ policies 
and challenges). In content, an overwhelming number of policy measures 
concentrate on innovation programmes and technology platforms (Reid and 
Peter, 2008). At the same time, the EE emerging innovation policies are 
characterized by their horizontal nature: policy measures typically do not 
specify sectors but are rather open to all sectors (see Figure 6). Arguably, this 
has to do with the way EE policy-makers understood EU state aid regulations 
(Reid and Peter, 2008). We argue that this has to do with both the general 
neo-liberal outlook inherited from the 1990s (i.e. market demand is seen as 
the key driver for the R&D system) internalized by most EE policy-makers 
by early the 2000s and also their particular skills that concentrated on the 
macro-economic area (see also Drahokoupil, 2007).
Figure 6:  Innovation Policy Measures in EE, Sector-specific Measures vs.
   Horizontal Measures19
Source: Based on Reid and Peter (2008).
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Figure 6 also shows that EE countries typically have significantly more 
innovation policy measures than EU15 (especially if deflated by the size of 
the respective economies). This can be interpreted as a growing fragmentation 
of the policy arena between a multitude of measures and implementation/
administrative agencies. 
As the majority of EE measures are financed through EU structural 
funds, these instruments are mostly competition and project based (i.e. with 
limited prioritization between different economic activities and industrial 
sectors; initiated for specific EU funding periods – 2004-2006; 2007-2013 
– and considerably revised in between). These aspects – project-based 
implementation, a multitude of horizontal measures – point to a high 
fragmentation of the entire innovation policy field as well as to a lack of 
policy priorities or the ability to set the latter. It is also evidence of the 
strongly market-driven understanding of innovation that is at odds with 
the underlying assumption that innovation policies need to alleviate the 
‘European paradox’. That is, a typical EE innovation policy measure aims 
to commercialize a certain R&D result, typically in a high-tech area, but the 
result and thus the initiative has to come from the market. This, however, 
has scarcely any justifications in reality: first, EE R&D systems and their 
performance disintegrated heavily during the 1990s and noticeably fell behind 
East Asia; and second, this was complemented by the strong specialization 
into the low-end of various value-chains, meaning that the demand for R&D 
and skills remains relatively low.
In terms of implementation, the trend initiated during the harmonization 
period through the creation of financial and management agencies has been 
intensified with the structural funds (see INNO-Policy TrendChart Country 
Reports, 2006, 2007 for an overview). It is fair to say that the problems 
with these agencies that started during the harmonization period have 
partially deepened since 2004. For example, in the case of Estonia (a country 
considered to have one of the most advanced Western-based innovation policy 
systems) it has been recently shown that the agencification of innovation 
policy implementation structure has resulted in significant fragmentation 
and duplication of innovation policy instruments (de Jong et al., 2008). This 
results in confusion over the targets and goals of formally similar measures; 
thereby increasing the costs and burden of coordination, control and evaluation 
(impacting both administrative capacity and future policy capacity); and also 
results in opportunities for rent-seeking and misuse of policy measures. 
It has also been shown (Ernst and Young, 2009) that this duplication and 
fragmentation has a significant impact on the capacity of the wider economic 
policy to reorient or readjust itself in the case of major external shocks, such 
as the economic crises. 
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Indeed, it can be argued that most problems summarized above in 
EE innovation policies go in one way or another back to the institutional 
framework of policy implementation. Almost all EE innovation policy 
implementation problems go back to very weak and disorganized actors; 
coordination problems are rampant in policy design and implementation (see 
also Radosevic, 2002: 355). On the one hand, there is a clear separation of 
policy responsibility between education/science and innovation/industry at the 
ministerial level and its delivery system (Nauwelaers and Reid, 2002: 365; 
also see INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports, 2006, 2007). On the other 
hand, this kind of fragmented policy-making system has in its turn resulted in 
the lack of inter-linking and cooperation between different innovation-related 
activities and actors such as research organizations, government and industry 
(see INNO-Policy TrendChart Country Reports, 2006, 2007).
While the creation and role of innovation policy agencies is highly 
praised by the official European Innovation Progress Report (2006: 65), we 
argue that precisely this agencification is at the root of many EE innovation 
policy problems. But the problems as such are not so much problems of 
agencification recognized in the mainstream research in the field (e.g. Pollitt 
et al., 2004; Pollitt, 2005; Christensen and Laegerid, 2005, 2006; Verhoest 
and Bouckaert, 2005). We argue that the agencification process has not 
only brought about the traditional problems of autonomy, coordination, 
regulation and control between ministries and agents; more importantly, 
because agencification has emerged in a context of a policy framework driven 
by market forces, the problem is firstly policy-related and only thereafter 
managerial. We argue that the no-policy period of innovation policy was based 
on a lack of policy capacity in innovation policy, and the following period 
has largely neglected the issue of policy capacity and mainly concentrated on 
developing administrative capacity. Therefore, even if administrative capacity 
is increased, the contextual policy capacity as such has been neglected; if 
one looks beyond the borders of the WC-based state capacity limits (i.e. 
the de facto legitimacy of state policies), it has even decreased. This, of 
course, is bound to lead to lower administrative capacity as well, even if 
the latter increased initially with EU structural funding. As fragmentation 
and coordination problems persist to paralyse the innovation policy arena, 
administrative capacity will also diminish.
Thus, due to the emphasis on efficiency, the agencification-based 
innovation policy implementation model favours outsourcing of programme 
management and is generally highly market-friendly as signals from the 
market are believed to be the best policy guide (see European Innovation 
Progress Report, 2006: 65-66). However, many EE countries have seen their 
economies massively restructured during the 1990s, which resulted, as we saw 
above, in an economic structure oriented towards outsourcing and low value-
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added activities or sectors where networking and linkages are naturally very 
low. Indeed, agencification in these kinds of circumstances does not foster 
sustainable networking practices but rather may cause severe problems in 
policy design and implementation as agencies are by definition at arm’s length 
to government offices. Such tendencies tend to cause instability in a system as 
a side effect (see here case studies about the old member states by Pollitt et 
al., 2004). That is why the issue of agencification, particularly in innovation 
policy, has been heavily raised by OECD in one of its latest reports (2005). 
Thus, to sum up, while EE innovation policies are significantly changing 
since the mid-2000s with the introduction of structural funds and through 
a strong influence from the European Commission, there are also serious 
problems that emerged with this trend. First, as we argued, the emerging 
innovation policies tend to be based on a rather linear understanding of 
innovation (from lab to market) whereas most EE countries are specialized 
in low-end production activities virtually void of any research and with low 
demand for high skills. In addition, the R&D system as such has been under 
constant pressure since the transition, and its performance has clearly been 
lacking. Thus, EE innovation policies tend to solve problems not existing in 
the respective economies, and in this context, the problem of misunderstanding 
the Soviet R&D and industry in the 1990s is replicated in the policy-making 
model of the 2000s.
Second, through the creation of innovation policy implementation/
administrative agencies the innovation policy landscape is fragmented and 
previous problems in policy creation (lack of strategic skills and capacity, 
networking and coordination non-existent) and implementation (competitive 
grant-based programming that relies on market signals without being able to 
follow set priorities and goals) have only deepened. One can argue that the 
innovation policies emerging in the process of Europeanization are based 
on the assumption that policy design and implementation follow the public-
private partnership model, yet in reality EE countries singularly lack the 
ability to implement such a model, and what is more, actual developments in 
industry seem to suggest that such a model is particularly ill-fitted to the EE 
context. Therefore, instead of emphasizing policy capacity as the centre of 
the innovation policy-making, the 2000s have limited themselves to policy 
transfer with attention mainly to administrative capacity.
To sum up the periods of “Restructuring” and “Europeanization”, we 
can draw a comparative table that depicts how innovation policy, capacity 
and their effects evolved in the last two decades in EE economies (Table 
3). This table is a snapshot of what we mean with copying paradox: EE 
countries increasingly adopt policies that imitate the developed countries’ 
innovation policies, yet this very process seems to hollow out local policy and 
administrative capacity creation and development.
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4. Why has the “Copying Paradox” Persisted?
In the previous section we provided stylized facts based argument that 
there are strong path dependencies in how innovation policy evolved in EE 
countries. In this section, we explain that these path dependencies originate 
from the particular timing of the EE countries’ re-entry into global capitalism 
when the discursive (process level) debate in both economic development 
and catching-up and policies was carried on, even partly ideological, by a 
movement that was inevitably proposed to and taken over by the EE policy 
communities. 
From our preceding analysis, we can bring out three claims that we have 
explicitly or implicitly made about the development of the IP trajectory in 
EE:
–   The 1990s period of innovation policy was inevitably a no-policy policy 
period because of the role of the WC policies;
–   Instead of an emphasis on developing policy capacity for a transition state, 
the combination of IP and PPA discourses resulted in an over-emphasis on 
administrative reforms and development that was perceived to positively 
affect the emergence of policy capacity;
–   Despite the peculiar but noticeable capacity (and legitimacy) of the state 
in IP and the development of administrative capacity, the expected policy 
outcomes have not emerged, and de-contextualized policy-making through 
policy transfer has remained the dominant policy mode.
4.1 Why Confusion in Diffusion?
Previously we argued that the EE countries had introduced innovation policy 
proper only during the periods of EU harmonization and accession, and the 
1990s were largely the domain of no-policy innovation policy. We argue that 
in fact the no-policy policy period together with the WC macro-economic 
policy model can be viewed as an approach to innovation, catching-up and 
industrial development that has depended on market forces, and therefore 
the lack of innovation (and in some cases industrial) policy during the 1990s 
in EE countries has been a conscious or inevitable result of the diffusion of 
the macro-economic stabilization policy to the domain of innovation policy. 
Therefore, we call the period “confusion in diffusion”.
In brief, it can all be linked to the universal acceptance of the WC policies 
as the model for achieving macro-economic stabilization. Yet, as has been 
argued in this paper and elsewhere (Tiits et al., 2008; Törok, 2007) the EE 
countries faced a two-level economic policy challenge: macro-economic 
stabilization and industrial restructuring. As the WC policies were solely 
concerned with the former, the EE countries faced a policy lacuna due to the 
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lack of a model that would accommodate both the needs of the latter challenge 
and be in line with the WC stabilization policies. 
Thus, the common vision of the reformers (both local and international) 
was to follow a rather clear idea that past Soviet legacies (both in policy 
and in policy-making) were largely detrimental and inefficient at achieving 
fundamental socio-economic turnarounds. Therefore, it can be said that the 
EE started with a clear understanding of what was not desirable (i.e. a strong 
role of the past communist state institutions), and though we have argued that 
during that period relatively strong state capacity emerged, it was strongly 
constrained by the WC principles. This made it inevitably obvious for the 
industrial restructuring to be based on a similar mode of policy thinking, i.e. 
relying on the market forces to sort-out the industrial challenges. This is what 
we call policy diffusion: the spread of the WC policy, which is primarily a 
macro-economic stabilization policy, to the IP discourse, too.
We believe that the uniqueness of the period, more precisely the lack of 
explicit innovation policy discourse for the EE countries, comes from the 
particular moment of time in the development of the “mainstream” industrial 
and innovation policy discourses that could have been used as a basis for more 
conscious policy transfer or policy modelling for the EE countries.
We can see that at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s (for a detailed historical account, see Soete, 2007; for an analysis 
of concept/discourse on development, see Sharif, 2006) the international/
Western discourse was facing a rather significant shift in understanding and 
approaching technological and industrial development. Namely, during the 
1970s and 1980s, there was a shift in emphasis of industrial policy from 
low-tech to high-tech industries. This was followed by the emergence and 
development of innovation policy, which has moved towards the “systems of 
innovation” approach and offers more systematic policy views by looking both 
at the innovating firms and their external environment. This can be interpreted 
as a path-dependent or cumulative development of the policy discourse in 
more developed European countries. Discussions over systems of innovation 
in the context of developing countries have only been a much more recent 
phenomenon (see Lundvall et al., 2009).
Thus, the developed world itself was largely facing a huge challenge 
to rethink policies and models for economic growth and technological 
advance. At least part of it can be attributed to the techno-economic paradigm 
shift (see Perez, 2002, 2007) that brought about new policy challenges as 
modularity in production processes (e.g. possibilities for outsourcing, etc.) 
changed the context of growth and development. Above, we have argued 
that the lack of attention to this issue at the catching-up context has been one 
of the main policy challenges in EE as well. Furthermore, the spread of the 
WC policies implied that it was against the idea of the general discourse of 
IJIE vol2-2 Karo.indd   191 8/20/2010   1:44:32 PM192      Erkki Karo and Rainer Kattel  
the economic restructuring to consider industrial policy (“picking winners” 
requires considerable policy capacity) as a policy tool that could be taken 
from the past experience of the developed Western economies (see also 
Radosevic, 2009).
In sum, we have argued that the innovation policy measures of EE have 
lacked the ability to tackle the core challenges of the respective systems of 
innovations. These challenges are largely issues that the developed countries 
had been dealing or accommodating with already through industrial policy, 
and the innovation policy as such can be viewed as a redefinition of industrial 
policy through re-prioritization or a shift in emphasis, but not a shift in 
understanding what the underlying mechanisms of innovation are.
Thus, the emergence of the period of “diffusion in confusion” can be 
explained from the point of innovation discourse through several factors:
–   The transition process or catching-up of the EE countries was largely 
foreign-led, i.e. the ideas or “best-practice” policy examples came from 
the Western countries;
–   The general discourse of innovation and development was passing through 
a rather significant transformation;
–   This created a situation where on the one hand, the discourse was dealing 
extensively with the issues of innovation and innovation policy (as a next 
level after industrial policy), but it did not pay attention to the developing 
country challenges;
–   The EE countries had a past experience with seemingly inefficient 
industrial policy because of weak state, policy and administrative 
capacity;
–   The WC discourse offered a suitable context and therefore became a 
substitute for innovation policy.
4.2 Why the Over-emphasis on Distinct Model of Administrative Capacity?
It can be stated that in the beginning of the 1990s the EE countries were 
facing a complexity of similar challenges from the perspective of the PPA 
discourse as they were facing in IP. Similar to economic policy, it was 
all about restructuring. The EE countries were facing a double challenge 
– to create basic institutions and to reform the state administration to free 
it from the “shackles” of communist bureaucracy and past inefficiencies 
(Randma-Liiv, 2009; Agh, 2003; Verheijen, 2003). Therefore, the challenge 
could be interpreted as re-establishing a belief in the state, and increasing 
policy and administrative capacity. As in IP, it all had to be done in the 
context of the international discourse development facing ideological and 
policy turmoil.
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Pollitt (2001, 2002) has argued that much of the Western public 
administration debate has converged around the concept of “New Public 
Management” denoting a specific model of public administration based 
on private-sector management principles (for more detailed accounts and 
discussions, see Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; 
Drechsler, 2005). The NPM movement has filled the public administration and 
policy arena with concepts such as privatization, quasi-markets, performance 
management, specialization, delegation, agencification, contracting-out, etc. 
But this convergence around the concept of NPM has to be understood as a 
discursive or talk level convergence because there is a rather convincing lack 
of empirical evidence of the positive impact of the reforms.
Thus, the last three decades of administrative development in Western 
democracies have been characterized by a theoretical and ideological battle 
between institutional, organizational and sociological theories and approaches 
that have highlighted the specificity of the public sphere and the theories from 
mainstream economics (public choice models, etc.) that have argued against 
the specificity of the public sector (for classics, see Osborne and Gaebler, 
1992; Mintzberg, 1996; for empirics, see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). 
Because of the dominance of the neoclassical economics in the discussions 
of the content of economic policy (at least as prescribed for the EE countries 
through the WC), it has also been easier to legitimize (on the discursive 
level) administrative theories and approaches based on similar theoretical 
assumptions in the PPA discourse – Reagan and Thatcher are highlighted as 
the most influential public figures leading the debates both in economic policy 
and public administration reforms (see for example, Williamson, 2000; Pollitt 
and Bouckaert, 2004). This argument has also been explicitly pronounced in 
the context of the EE countries, especially as it is in line with both theoretical 
and ideological premises of the WC.
In principle, there can be a similar argument made from two sides. 
The WC economic policies were particularly market-friendly and argued 
that the EE governments should contract out and give as much as possible 
for the market forces to sort out. The NPM movement was based on the 
public choice school of thought that, on the one hand, prescribed policies 
that similarly assumed the primacy of the market (i.e. a limited role for the 
government in the spheres where the market does function), and on the other 
hand, prescribed managerial principles based on the same private-sector 
management techniques. Therefore, it is rather obvious that these discourses 
have the theoretical and rhetorical arguments to support each other’s claims 
and to offer remedies for each other in policy-making and implementation.
In the EE-innovation-policy context, we have argued that the no-policy 
period was followed by a rather explicit increase in the role of the government 
and the state, though as providing only incentives for the market forces to 
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sort out policy challenges. We have also highlighted that the governmental 
interventions, as prescribed by the EU, were largely based on the idea 
of creating new “legacy-free” administrative agencies for implementing 
innovation policy.
Interestingly, looking at the public IP discourse at the level of OECD 
(2005, 2009) and Box (2009), it can be seen that the debate on the pros 
and cons of agencification in the implementation of IP may not only be a 
misinterpretation of the context of EE development, but a wider problem of 
the lacking ability to absorb the empirical experiences of agencification that 
can be found in the PPA discourse. That is, the extensive mapping of the 
innovation systems by OECD (2005) recognizes the coordination, control 
and accountability problems of agencies (classical problems in principal-
agent relationship), but the policy recommendations rely on the need to 
further clarify the role-divisions between ministries (policy) and agencies 
(implementation), with the latter also given increasing autonomy and lead 
in policy discourse (see also OECD, 2009). Yet, the agency research in PPA 
discourse highlights this as one of the fundamental and in essence practically 
unsolvable issues of agencification, or even as detrimental to the state and 
policy capacity if achieved because of the erosion of democratic accountability 
and policy capacity. Thus, the solutions to the perceived problem seem to be 
misinterpreted and would lead to deeper problems. 
Thus, in the context of EE, it can be argued that the NPM movement, 
along with its concepts such as agencification, has largely shifted from the 
international context where the main challenge has been first and foremost 
to increase the efficiency of the public management system, to the context 
where the primary concern has been to create or increase the effectiveness of 
the government policies and the state. In our analytical distinction, the tools 
for increasing administrative capacity have largely been equated to tools for 
increasing policy and state capacity. But this can be seen as looking at fun-
damentally contradictory goals with the same glasses – managerial efficiency 
and effectiveness is about organizing and managing resources necessary 
for policy implementation (in essence, cost-efficiency); policy efficiency 
and effectiveness is about creating and maintaining capacities necessary for 
designing proper policies (in essence, investments in the future). The reforms 
of the managerial capacities in the framework of NPM-like principles have 
been proven to be the likely cause of the reduction of policy capacities.
4.3 Why Then is Innovation Policy Still “Lost in Transfer”?
We have argued that in the context of the EE countries and their innovation 
policy development, the period of “confusion in diffusion” has been followed 
by an explicit emphasis on innovation policy that has been based on, 
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firstly, misunderstanding the problems of innovation in EE and, secondly, 
misinterpreting the policy problem as merely a managerial issue. As the 
1990s in EE were infused with the public-choice discourse both in terms of 
the content of innovation policy and the context of innovation policy-making 
and implementation, the influence of the EU at the end of the 1990s was 
largely based upon the same policy context: the EE countries had lacked a 
conscious emphasis on developing policy analysis and policy development 
skills; and because of the lack of innovation policy proper, these capacities 
and skills did not have any incentive to emerge in the process. Therefore, 
the conscious attempts at innovation policy development were also foreign-
led, more specifically based on the ideas and models proposed by the EU. 
Thus, the development of innovation policy for EE was largely based on 
the discourse of the innovation policy that limits the attention due to the 
contextual characteristics of the EE. And these have been lost in the context 
of policy transfer.
The recent “stock-taking” on innovation policy development by OECD 
(Box, 2009: 2) summarizes the development of the innovation policy discourse 
as follows:
The stocktaking highlights that much work, both theoretical and empirical, 
has already been done to identify the policies, institutions and framework 
conditions that can provide the most effective means of supporting innovation. 
However, evaluation of specific government support policies and their impacts 
on innovation is generally sparse and there is a need for more and better evidence 
on the costs and benefits of government support for innovation.
Therefore, the current discourse lacks evidence of the convergence of results; 
that is, there is no clear-cut evidence of the best policy, even in the context 
of developed countries. As the same assessment further highlights (Box, 
2009: 14-16), the system of innovations approach provides a generalized 
model for assessing innovation policies in different systems. The policy mix 
to solve the challenges of the system has to be mostly context-dependent 
because “there are major national differences in comparative and competitive 
advantages, implying potentially different patterns of response to similar 
policy instrument”. Thus, we can also conclude that despite discursive and 
formal decisional convergence in innovation policy debates, we cannot 
presume and also lack in-depth evidence that there is convergence in actions, 
i.e. that generic policy measures that seem to have similar labels in different 
countries carry identical content across contexts. Rather, there seems to be 
more weight to the argument that universalistic policy discourse and formal 
decisions are facing contextual feasibility and desirability challenges once 
implemented in specific systems, or countries.
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We believe that herein lays the reason why the rather positive vision of 
EE innovation policy mixes that we have discussed and elaborated in section 
3 has emerged. Innovation policy proper arrived at the policy-making arena 
only at the end of the 1990s, by which time the WC-based economic policy 
and NPM-dominated administrative reform model (i.e., increasing managerial 
efficiency before policy effectiveness had been created and then secured) had 
created a discernable path of the state’s role in economic development and 
policies that by most accounts misinterpreted the situation. 
Therefore, the innovation policy development since the late 1990s was 
based on the presumption that chosen policies and paths had been the cause 
of the success in terms of economic growth and that growth represented 
a proof of sustainable economic restructuring. This means that, although 
we could witness a considerable shift in the EE discourse over innovation 
policy (from no-policy policy to explicit public policy) it was still just an 
incremental change (or cyclical alternation) in the initial policy path because 
the problems of innovation were seen as merely market-failure problems 
that can be solved by “non-too-interventionist” policy measures (horizontal 
innovation policy measures), and policy problems were seen more as 
administrative capacity problems than policy capacity challenges. From our 
point of view and according to our analysis, this has created a situation where 
innovation policy measures have been transferred to the EE countries without 
a comprehensive policy analysis capacity to truly assess the suitability and 
also theoretical validity. In this context, policy analysis mostly deals with the 
analysis of the administrative capacity for implementing ideal-type models 
designed from other contexts (“feasibility studies”) and not as much with the 
analysis of the suitability and contextual applicability of the ideal-models 
(“desirability studies”). The issue of policy capacity has hardly been at the 
centre of discussion in the context of innovation policy development and 
implementation since the beginning of the 1990s.
Thus, the “lost in transfer” period can be summarized in several discern-
ible developments:
–   External economic forces created a misconception about the impact of 
the chosen WC path on the economic restructuring and sustainability of 
growth;
–   The emerging innovation policy proper represents only a partial shift 
within the larger WC trajectory of policy-making;
–   The international administrative reform discourse has limited the emphasis 
on administrative capacity and managerial efficiency, disregarding the 
interconnections with policy capacity;
–   The resulting policy and administrative capacity is largely de-contextual-
ized and therefore lacks the ability for substantive policy analysis.
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5. Conclusion
In our paper, we have followed the development of the trajectory of the 
innovation policy in EE since the beginning of the 1990s, and we have 
argued that since its emergence as a no-policy in the 1990s, it has been a 
path-dependent process with changes that at first seem to be fundamental (the 
changes in 2000s induced by the harmonization process and the EU policy 
models) but which, if looked at in more detail, are representations of cycles/
alternations within the limits set by the initial starting point and understanding 
of the policy challenges.
We have argued that within the innovation policy development, we can 
witness misunderstandings or misconceptions both from the perspective of IP 
discourse and from the perspective of PPA discourse.
Based on the former, the initial mistake of the 1990s was to misunderstand 
the nature of Soviet R&D systems and industry. From the perspective of two 
decades and more, placing this misconception at the centre of the economic 
and innovation policy can be seen as the critical juncture that re-defined the 
role of the state in industrial and innovation policy from over-involvement 
of the Soviet era to explicitly market-led and dominated policy models. We 
have argued that this was mainly caused and reinforced by the peculiar state-
capacity definition and state legitimacy that was brought about by the wider 
WC policy toolbox and that diffused into the IP arena. Later in the 2000s, the 
same mistake/misconception was redefined into the “European paradox” that 
was followed by the policy-transfer from the EU toolbox.
Based on the latter discourse, by the end of the no-policy policy that was 
triggered by external forces such as the EU, the innovation policy problem 
was seen as an administrative capacity problem that was to be solved by 
administrative reform. Yet, we have shown that all of this has resulted in the 
non-emergence of policy capacity that would seem to be pivotal for a con-
textual analysis of feasible and desirable policies. To date, the role of public 
policies in innovation has been constrained by the initial WC ideas; i.e. even 
if the EU toolbox, compared to that of the WC, has increased the legitimacy 
of state intervention in this policy area, it is still largely based on the primacy 
of the market forces (policies are horizontal and implemented through market 
principles). Therefore, the changes of innovation policy at the end of the 1990s 
and 2000s, both in the content and context of innovation policy trajectories 
have largely been cycles or alternations in the initial policy mode.
This is summarized and graphically sketched in Figure 7. The vertical 
axis reflects a continuum of definitions of state capacity, i.e. “capacity defined 
through market forces” indicates that the market is a more effective decision 
tool over the content and context of policies; “capacity defined through the 
scope of the public policies” indicates the opposite or that the market forces 
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face significant challenges in creating optimal solutions, and the state can 
either create additional incentives for the market forces or act instead of the 
market forces. By definition, the latter would presume a stronger and more 
developed policy and administrative capacity. The horizontal axis is essentially 
the “time” perspective from the beginning of the 1990s (WC) until the 2000s 
(EU), but also reflective of the two analytical/ideal types of policies – the 
“WC policies” and the “EU policies” – and the description of the emergence 
of these policies (e.g. from “diffusion in confusion” to “lost in transfer”). The 
dotted diagonal lines indicate the “constraints of the policies created by the 
WC” – i.e. despite witnessing an increase in government/public policies, we 
can still argue that these policies are still closer to market-based approaches 
as opposed to other more state-interventionist policies (setting sectoral 
preferences and measures, etc.). In addition, the figure contains indicative 
lines of the development of the innovation policy trajectory and respective 
capacities to graphically illustrate the contradictions in policy development.
Therefore, the EE countries have largely been moving towards de-
contextualization of policy making and have followed a trajectory of develop-
ment that has made it increasingly difficult firstly to realize the need for 
fundamental changes and secondly to have the capacity to carry these changes 
through. Thus we can track the emergence of a peculiar mode of state capacity 
that paradoxically or actually, characteristically for ex-Soviet countries, over-
estimates the power of market forces in the context of economic restructuring, 
Figure 7:  The Path-dependency of the Innovation Policy Development 
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technological development and innovation (“creative destruction”) and creates 
what we call the “copying paradox”.
We believe that we are also witnessing a modest or even significantly 
decreasing policy capacity in these countries that does not seem to have been 
an issue of importance throughout the 1990s and 2000s. As a result, the only 
recognisable level of substantive development seems to be administrative 
capacity. But this has resulted in almost extreme complexity: fragmentation 
of policy measures and implementations means that are detrimental to any 
policy capacity emergence. Therefore, over the last two decades, the EE 
countries have misinterpreted their problems, misread their development and 
misunderstood the international policy arenas from where they are copying 
policy ideas. The innovation policy of the EE countries has been playing with 
fire by constantly moving closer to locking itself into the worst possible policy 
modes – implementing “wrong things” badly or, even worse, implementing 
“wrong things” well. Paradoxically, the “wrong thing” may just be the over-
estimation of the level of development and the adoption of too complex 
policies. And this is precisely a problem of policy capacity.
Notes 
 1.  Corresponding author. Research for this study was partially supported by the 
Estonian Science Foundation (grants 6703, 7441, 7577). The authors would like 
to thank Wolfgang Drechsler and two anonymous referees for useful comments 
and feedback.
 2.  In the context of this article, Eastern European countries are the following ten 
most recent member states of the European Union: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
 3.  We argue that at least in the context of transferring policies from more developed 
to developing countries, the contextualization of policies through policy analysis 
is often done through incremental changes within the dominant policy discourse 
(in our paper WC and NPM). For a similar argument placed into policy transfer 
literature, i.e. supply and demand based policy transfer, see Randma-Liiv 
(2005).
 4.  For instance, the theoretical approach for technological catching-up and 
development can be divided into several opposing theoretical models, e.g. from 
neoclassical to Schumpeterian/evolutionary/institutional schools (for a more 
comprehensive overview see for example Nelson and Winter, 1982). In this 
context, the ideal-type policy mixes for innovation and catching-up that the EE 
countries could have considered range from “import substitution”-type policies 
to WC-based models to post-WC-based/EU-led approaches (for an excellent 
overview see Radosevic, 2009).
 5.  Isomorphism is defined as a process of homogenization that “forces one unit 
in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions” (Knill, 2005: 5; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 66).
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 6.  Policy transfer is a “process by which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is 
used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in another political system” (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000: 5).
 7.  Policy diffusion refers to processes that might result in increasing policy 
similarities across countries hence leading to policy convergences. Though 
there are two different approaches to diffusion – it can be either described as the 
spread of policies independent of causal factors (e.g. it can be both voluntary 
and coercive) or it can be defined through the voluntary adoption (as opposed to 
coercive) of different policies. (Knill, 2005: 3) In our paper, we look at diffusion 
in the more flexible sense allowing it to be caused by a broad range of causal 
factors.
 8.  The convergence as such can be divided into four layers that have different 
implications on policy development and on our understanding of convergence 
(Pollitt, 2001, 2002): discursive convergence, e.g. convergence at the level of talk; 
decisional convergence, e.g. convergence at the level of public decisions over 
policy, technique, organizational form; practice convergence, e.g. convergence on 
the level of working practices or policy mixes used; results convergence, e.g. the 
level where reforms and policies produce their intended (and unintended) effects 
so that the outputs and outcomes begin to converge. The former two are more in 
line with the process-level analysis and the latter two more with the effects-level 
analysis. The empirical proofs of the policy development both in PPA discourse 
(for an overview, see Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004) and IP discourse (for the 
latest overview, see Box, 2009) are largely limited to the process-level analysis 
(e.g., analyzing official governmental statements, policy documents, other public 
declarations, formal decisions and programs, etc.).
 9.  For a literature review and discussion in the context of developing/transition 
countries, see Savi (2007).
  10.  We use innovation systems here in a rather generic meaning as a system of actors 
and features that determine, in the broadest sense of the word, how and why 
companies innovate (see Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993).
  11.  See for detailed country overviews European Commission’s Innovation Trend-
Chart (2006, 2007); see also Radosevic (2004, 2006); Reid and Peter (2008); 
Kattel, Reinert and Suurna (2009). The best research on the EE innovation 
systems from the late 1990s also covers the earlier transition period; see in 
particular, Radosevic (1998, 1999).
  12.  Including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.
  13.  The figures include only selected EE countries; the selection is based on data 
availability.
  14.  This sub-section builds on Kattel, Reinert and Suurna (2009).
  15.  For a great theoretical and conceptual analysis in the context of agencification and 
its impact on specialization and coordination and the eternal dilemmas between 
these contrasting ideas, see Verhoest and Bouckaert (2005).
  16.  The index is built from four sub-indices that are in turn based on the following 
data (in parenthesis): Absorptive capacity (Expenditures in education as a % of 
GDP; S&E graduates as a % of the population between 20-29; Population with 3rd 
level education; Participation in life-long learning; Employment in medium/high-
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tech manufacturing; Employment in high-tech services); R&D supply (Public 
R&D expenditures as a % of GDP; Business R&D expenditures as a % of GDP; 
R&D personnel; EPO high-tech patents; USPTO high-tech patens; Resident 
patents per capita); Diffusion (Training enterprises as % of all enterprises; CVT 
as a % of labour costs of all enterprises; ISO 9000 certificates per capita; Internet 
users per 10,000 inhabitants; PCs per 100 inhabitants; ICT expenditures as a % 
of GDP); Demand (Stock market capitalisation as a % of GDP; Domestic credit 
provided by banking sector; Share of FDI in GDP; Share of trade in GDP; Index 
of patent rights; Registered unemployment) (Radosevic, 2004).
  17.  For a general overview, see the EU’s official homepage for structural funding, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/funds/prord/sf_en.htm.
  18.  An excellent discussion of the paradox is Dosi, Llerena and Labini (2005).
  19.  Sector-specific are policy instruments that deal with one sector (e.g. bio-
technology) only; horizontal measures are allocated to multiple sectors or do not 
specify any sector at all. See for details Reid and Peter (2008).
  20.  The figure is inspired from Pollitt (2008: 51-63).
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